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I. Introduction
Since 1999, action by the European Union (the EU) as well as by the European
Community (the Community or the EC) has been necessary to implement United
Nations Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, which impose economic measures against ‘blacklisted’ persons and
corporate entities, in the framework of the so-called ‘war on terror’.1 A list of
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grant ‘Terrorism and the Non-State Actor After September 11: The Role of Law in the Search for Security’
(DP0451473 awarded for 2004-2007). My thanks go to Dr Pene Mathew, Ms Miriam Gani and Professor
Andrew Byrnes for their editing work and comments on this article. I am also grateful to
Professor Simon Bronitt and Dr Mark Nolan for reading early drafts of this article. Finally, I am indebted
to Ms Helen Bermingham, a graduate of the ANU College of Law, for her invaluable research work on
many sources I used in this article. All mistakes remain mine. The chapter is updated to January 2007.
1  On UN Security Council sanctions in general, and for a discussion, from the perspective of human
rights protection, of the sanctions regimes currently in place, see V Gowlland-Debbas (ed), United
Nations Sanctions and International Law (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2001); A Reinisch,
‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the
Imposition of Economic Sanctions’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 851; M E O’Connell,
‘Debating the Law of Sanctions’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 63; B Fassbender,
‘Targeted Sanctions and Due Process’ (2006) Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin and United Nations Office
of Legal Affairs, Office of the Legal Counsel <www.un.org/law/counsel/Fassbender_study.pdf>;
I Cameron, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security
Council Counter-Terrorism Sanctions’ (2006) Council of Europe
<http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/public_international_law/
Texts_&_Documents/2006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2006.pdf>; A Bianchi, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness
of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion’ (2006)
17 European Journal of International Law 881; A Bianchi, ‘Security Council’s Anti-terror Resolutions
and their Implementation by Member States’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1044. For
a discussion of the work of the different sanctions committees, see the report by T Biersteker and
S Eckert, Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures (2006) The Watson Institute
for International Studies, <http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf>;
J Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
Scholarly contributions analysing the EU (and EC) implementation of Security Council sanctions include:
S Bohr, ‘Sanctions by the UN Security Council and the EC’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International
Law 256; I Canor, ‘Can Two Walk Together, except they Be Agreed? The Relationship between
International Law and European Law: The Incorporation of UN Sanctions against Yugoslavia into
European Community Law through the Perspective of the ECJ’ (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review
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persons and entities having ties with the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, Al Qa’ida,
or their associates, is managed and updated by a Security Council committee set
up, inter alia, to monitor states’ efforts to implement the sanctions imposed with
Resolution 1267 (1999), and known as the ‘1267 Committee’ or the ‘Taliban
Sanctions Committee’.2  A separate committee, called the ‘Counter-Terrorism
Committee’ (CTC) was set up by the Security Council in order to supervise states’
compliance with Resolution 1373 (2001),3  most notably with the measures
providing for the freezing of assets and other economic and financial resources
of those who commit acts of terrorism, or attempt to commit them, or who take
part in them. The 1267 Committee’s list of terrorist individuals and entities is
‘based on information provided by states and regional organisations’.4 The CTC,
unlike the 1267 Committee, does not draw up or impose any such lists.
The implementation of UN counter-terrorism sanctions by the EU is in many
aspects a good test of the efficacy of the UN strategy to combat terrorism, through
the imposition of specific obligations on states and of sanctions on non-state
actors.5  According to several commentators, one of the most controversial aspects
137; N Vennemann, ‘Country Report on the European Union’ in C Walter et al (ed), Terrorism as a
Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty? (Berlin, London, New York:
Springer, 2004) 217; A Reinisch, ‘The Action of the European Union to Combat International Terrorism’
in A Bianchi (ed), Enforcing International Law Norms against Terrorism (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004)
119-62; R Pavoni, ‘UN Sanctions in EU and National Law: The Centro-Com Case’ (1999) 48 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 582. Pavoni correctly notes that ‘a very interesting and unprecedented
(but now established) practice has emerged in the EC/EU context with respect to the implementation
of UN embargoes of the 1990s and a particular institutional machinery … has been set up for that
purpose’ (at 583).
2 In para 6 of Resolution 1267 (1999), the Security Council established a committee composed of all the
Council’s members. The committee is responsible most notably for ensuring that states implement the
measures imposed by para 4 of the said resolution, and for designating the funds or other financial
resources referred to in this paragraph. Initially established to monitor states’ sanctions on
Taliban-controlled territory, the 1267 Committee has progressively seen its scope of activity extended
to all measures against individuals and entities associated with the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and
Al Qa’ida. See E Rosand, ‘The Security Council’s Efforts to Monitor the Implementation of
Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions’, (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 745.
3  On the work of the CTC see, inter alia, E Rosand, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373, the
Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International
Law 333; E J Flynn, ‘The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights’ (2007)
7 Human Rights Law Review 371.
4  S/RES/1333 (2000) [16b].
5  On the EU implementation of counter-terrorism sanctions, see generally I Cameron, ‘European Union
Anti-Terrorist Blacklisting’ (2003) 3 Human Rights Law Review 225, who examines various aspects of
the implementation and the legal effects of EU sanctions (most notably through the case study of Sweden)
and of the legal remedies available to the blacklisted individuals, especially before the ECrtHR. He
correctly highlights that ‘while the ECrtHR is a better body than the CFI or ECJ to check the compatibility
of EU measures with human rights, it is easy to forget that the ECHR standards are designed to be
subsidiary, or supplementary to the national constitutional standards, which form the first, and most
important, line of defence of the Rechtstaat’ (255). See also the contributions of C Warbrick, ‘The
European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International
Law 989; B Bowring and D Korff, ‘Terrorist Designation with Regard to European and International
Law: The Case of the PMOI’, (Paper presented at the International Conference of Jurists in Paris, 10
November 2004) 30 (2005) Statewatch
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/feb/bb-dk-joint-paper.pdf>; I Tappeiner, ‘The Fight against
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of the sanctions regimes is the risk that such measures, under the pretext of the
‘war on terror’, may encourage and legitimise violations of some fundamental
human rights at the UN level,6  at the regional level (eg the EU), as well as at the
domestic level. Most notably, the procedure through which individuals and
entities associated with the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and Al Qa’ida are labelled
as ‘terrorists’ and put into a list has been the object of extensive criticism.
In this chapter I focus on the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
originating from lawsuits filed by individuals and entities targeted by the
sanctions adopted by EU and EC institutions when implementing the UN
sanctions.7  Such complaints are always dealt with initially by the Court of First
Instance (CFI) and its judgments may be appealed to the ECJ. The thrust of the
plaintiffs’ complaints is the alleged invalidity of certain Community acts under
which they are listed. They argue that they are prevented from living normal
lives and conducting their financial activities normally, as a consequence of
being listed by the EU and having their assets and funds frozen, and because of
damage to their personal and professional reputation. Violations of several human
rights which are guaranteed under international law, Community law and
constitutional traditions common to the EC member states,8  are thus alleged,
including the right to use property, the right to a fair hearing and the right to
effective judicial review.
Judicial review of counter-terrorism sanctions listing individuals and entities is
not available at the suit of individuals through the principal judicial organ of
the UN, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Nor has the Security Council
manifested any intention to set up any subsidiary body empowered to examine
Terrorism. The List and the Gaps’ (2005) 1 Utrecht Law Review 97; N Lavranos, ‘Judicial Review of UN
Sanctions by the Court of First Instance’ (2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 471; R A Wessel,
‘Regulation beyond the State: Accountability of International Organizations in a Multilevel Legal Order’,
(Paper presented at the Annual Ius Commune Conference, Edinburgh, 1-2 December 2005); W Vlcek,
‘Acts to Combat the Financing of Terrorism: Common Foreign and Security Policy at the European Court
of Justice’ (2006) 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 491; C Lehnardt, ‘European Court Rules on UN
and EU Terrorist Suspect Blacklists’ (2007) 11 ASIL Insight <
http://www.asil.org/insights/2007/01/insights070131.html>. Monar’s Chapter 11 in this volume, provides
a general background on the EU response to international terrorism, including most notably the recent
‘Terrorism Framework Decision’ and the ‘European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision’.
6 The issues relating to the lack, or to a belated and partial incorporation, of a human rights framework
in the procedural and substantive aspects of the CTC are analysed with respect to the treatment of
asylum-seekers by P Mathew, ‘Resolution 1373 — a Call to Preempt Asylum Seekers? (or, “Osama the
Asylum Seeker”)’, in J McAdam (ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2008) 19.
7 The relevant acts must be adopted by the European Council (‘the Council’) also on the basis of the EC
treaty, because action of the Community is always necessary to implement certain aspects of ‘common
positions’ adopted in the EU framework: it would then be appropriate to refer each time to ‘EU/EC’
sanctions and ‘EU/EC’ counter-terrorism action — see also below n 19. However, throughout the paper
I will be referring mostly to ‘EU sanctions’ or ‘EU action’ for simplicity’s sake.
8  For more discussion on the sources of human rights protection in the EU system, see below, section
III.
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individuals’ claims.9  As for the remedies offered by international courts and
bodies supervising the implementation of international human rights instruments,
they are an option only once domestic remedies have been exhausted: this is,
for instance, the case for the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECrtHR), under Article 35 (1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).10  However, it is not clear
how this prerequisite may be satisfied where UN sanctions are implemented
through acts adopted at the EU level rather than by states.11  So, even though
some commentators have argued that, as a matter of principle, national courts
may legally afford judicial review of mandatory resolutions adopted by
international organisations (and of international treaties),12  this does not seem
an option in the cases examined here. As the remainder of this paper will show,
the ECJ is sometimes the first and the only avenue of relief available to concerned
individuals and entities.13  But is the ECJ willing and able to play its role in such
cases?
The Court has previously been confronted, in the mid-1990s, with the issue of
the legality of sanctions of a different kind, most notably comprehensive
diplomatic, economic and trade sanctions (eg, general trade embargoes), imposed
on either states or non-state actors, or both, involved in armed conflicts. For
instance, in the Bosphorus Case the Court examined the question as to whether
restrictions of property rights and of the right to exercise economic activities
may be justified in the framework of the implementation at Community level of
UN sanctions adopted against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.14
9 Interestingly, a reference to this possibility (in particular, to an ‘independent international court’)
was made by the CFI in two judgments handed down on 21 September 2005: Yusuf and Al Barakaat
International Foundation v Council and Commission (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [340] (hereafter Yusuf)
and Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [285] (hereafter Kadi).
Both cases are discussed below, section III, subparagraphs A and B.
10 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 222
(entered into force 3 September 1953). According to art 35 (1) ‘[t]he Court may only deal with the matter
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken.’
11  On the right to effective access to the ECrtHR, see Cameron, above n 5, 248-50.
12 This point is developed, inter alia, by Benedetto Conforti in the report he submitted to the Institute
of International Law (Institut de droit international), ‘The Activities of National Judges and the
International Relations of their State’ (1993) 65 Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international I-65, 347-51,
389-91; see also B Conforti, ‘Decisioni del Consiglio di sicurezza e diritti fondamentali in una bizzarra
sentenza del Tribunale comunitario di primo grado’ (2006) 11 Il Diritto dell’Unione Europea 333, 344;
E de Wet and A Nollkaemper, ‘Review of Security Council Resolutions by National Courts’ (2002) 45
German Yearbook of International Law 166, 184-202.
13  Bowring and Korff, above n 5. For a discussion of the ECJ jurisdiction in such cases, see below,
section III.
14 This is still the leading case in this area (Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for
Transport, Energy and Communications, Ireland and the Attorney General (C-84/95) [1996] ECR I-3953).
Bosphorus Airways was a Turkish charter airline which leased a Yugoslav State-owned plane,
subsequently seized by the Irish authorities under the sanctions regime decided by the UN Security
Council against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), and implemented through an EC Regulation
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However, the case law of the ECJ offers no precedent exactly in the area of
counter-terrorism sanctions of the kind examined here, that is, measures targeting
designated non-state actors suspected of being involved in terrorist activities or
associated with terrorist organisations.15
Recently confronted with claims against these measures, the CFI has held that
it could not review them.16  I will analyse from the perspective of the protection
of human rights some of the most controversial issues emerging from
representative cases before the CFI, in order to show the extent to which there
has been an evolution in the Court’s approach to the review of European
counter-terrorism sanctions. As I will show, with respect to the EU sanctions
implementing Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) the Court maintains that
review of the relevant Community acts would necessarily entail review of the
UN Resolution itself, which would be clearly beyond its jurisdiction. However,
the Court reserves to itself the power to review Security Council resolutions at
(Council Regulation No 990/93 of 26 April 1993, concerning trade between the EC and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), [1993] OJ L 102/14). Bosphorus Airways challenged the seizure
before the Irish courts, arguing that the EC sanctions were not susceptible to being applied against an
undertaking not incorporated (and not operating) in the FRY. The Irish Supreme Court eventually
referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling (under art 234 of the EC Treaty), given that Ireland
was implementing the EC sanctions adopted to implement, in turn, the UN-mandated economic sanctions.
The ECJ stated that the aim to stop the armed conflict in the FRY had to be given precedence over the
rights invoked by Bosphorus Airways; the latter, according to the Court, are not absolute rights and
may thus be sacrificed for the objectives of general interest pursued by the Community, that is, ending
the conflict. Thus, the seizure of the aircraft required by the EC regulation constituted no violation of
the property right of Bosphorus. The applicant then decided to institute proceedings before the European
Court of Human Rights: see below n 71 and accompanying text. The CFI subsequently upheld the
Bosphorus judgment in Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v Council and Commission ((C-184/95)
[1998] ECR I-1443), where the applicant, a German-based engineering consulting company, asked the
Court to order the Council and the Commission to compensate it for damage suffered as a result of
Regulation (EC) No 2340/90, on the embargo on trade with Iraq and Kuwait. The application was
dismissed by the CFI, because the contested EC regulation was adopted in order to implement Security
Council Resolution 661 (1990), and therefore as part of the action towards the maintenance of international
peace and security in the area. In the Court’s opinion, negative consequences for some operators
(essentially, limitations to the freedom to trade) were justified also because the economic risk in doing
business in Iraq had not been exceeded. See the note on the Dorsch Consult Case by J Kokott and
R Schlölch in International Decisions (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 668.
15 These measures are sometimes referred to as ‘smart sanctions’. Such is the terminology adopted, for
instance, by the CFI in the Yusuf and Kadi judgments of 21 September 2005. The Court said that such
sanctions, being targeted and selective, ‘reduce the suffering endured by the civilian population of the
country concerned, while none the less imposing genuine sanctions on the targeted regime and those
in charge of it’ (Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [113], [122] and Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649
[90]). The Court was clearly trying to show the distinction between these sanctions and other kinds of
sanctions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, already mentioned in
the text, and which are not examined any further in this paper. Fassbender (above n 1, 4), correctly
points out that the regime instituted under SC Resolution 1267 (1999) differs from all the other UN
sanctions regimes ‘in that, after the Taliban were removed from power in Afghanistan, there is no
particular link between the targeted individuals and entities and a specific country’.
16  According to a note prepared by Statewatch in January 2007, the CFI judgment of December 2006
in the OMPI Case (see below n 139) ‘represents the first successful legal challenge to the EU proscription
regime: 13 previous challenges have been dismissed (seven cases have been appealed to the ECJ, another
seven cases are pending)’ (Statewatch News Online, Successful Challenge to EU “Terrorist” list by PMOI
(2007) Statewatch <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/jan/04ecj-pmoi.htm>).
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least where violations of human rights protected by jus cogens norms are alleged.
This line of reasoning, which has failed to convince several commentators, will
then be analysed.17  In contrast, the Court has fully scrutinised and declared
invalid an EC regulation implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373
(2001) because of the different features of the sanctions regime established under
that resolution.18  My analysis will also illustrate how the potential concurrent
jurisdiction of different judicial bodies may in some cases produce the result
that only very limited judicial review of EU counter-terrorism sanctions is offered
when human rights violations are alleged.
II. Enforcing United Nations Counter-Terrorism Sanctions
in the European Community/European Union System
In order to provide some background information for the analysis to follow, it
is appropriate first to outline briefly the main features of the two sanctions
regimes set up by the UN Security Council as part of its counter-terrorism
strategy, and then the implementing measures (‘common positions’ and
regulations) adopted within the EU framework.19
17 These points are further developed later in this chapter, see below section III, subparagraphs A and
B.
18  See the discussion below at section III, subpara D.
19 Generally speaking, UN sanctions of an economic and financial nature must be implemented by the
EC rather than by its member states because, under art 133 EC Treaty, the Community has an exclusive
competence in the area of external trade. Action by the Community, under art 301 and art 60 EC Treaty,
depends in these cases on previous action by the EU pursuant to the EU Treaty provisions in the field
of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP, see below n 23), that is, by the agreement of a common
position or a joint action. As to the acts adopted, they are usually regulations and ‘common positions’,
respectively. Council regulations are normative acts adopted by the EC and identified by their general
and direct applicability in the Community legal order, as well as by their binding character in their
entirety. In other words, regulations produce direct effects, and thus confer rights and duties, in the
domestic orders of all member states, even in the absence of measures for domestic implementation (see,
for instance, J Steiner, L Woods and C Twigg-Flesner, EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9th
ed, 2006) 93-4; S Bronitt, F Burns and D Kinley, Principles of European Community Law (New South
Wales, Australia: Law Book Company, 1995) 102; or the EU official website,
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/legislation_en.htm>). On the other hand, EU ‘common positions’
are not acts of a Community nature and must be defined within the framework of two procedures of
the EU law-making process, that is, the cooperation procedure and the co-decision procedure: see arts
251 and 252 of the EC Treaty, formerly arts 189b and 189c respectively, the full text of which, together
with the rules of procedures of the European Parliament relating to common positions, can be read at
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/commonpositions/default_en.htm> (for insights on the EU law making
process, see ex multis Bronitt, Burns and Kinley, 86-91). In other words, common positions are adopted
by the Council but not on the basis of the EC Treaty. For instance, common positions may be adopted
by the Council, composed of representatives of the governments of member states, in the field of Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA, or the third pillar of the EU, see below n 23) under Title VI, art 34 of the EU
Treaty, as well as in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, or second pillar of the EU,
see Bronitt, Burns and Kinley, 86-91) under Title V, art 15 of the EU Treaty. The most relevant element,
for our analysis, is the fact that common positions are not subject to review of their lawfulness before
the CFI/ECJ.
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Prior to 11 September 2001 (9/11), the EU institutions had put in place a common
response to international terrorism20  in order to implement Security Council
resolutions 1267 (1999)21  and 1333 (2000).22 They were acting on the basis of
both the Treaty on the European Union (in particular, the so-called second and
third pillars of the EU, respectively the CFSP and the JHA)23  and the European
Community Treaty (the so-called first pillar).24 The European Council adopted
implementing acts as early as November 1999, and then regularly adopted updates
in order to follow the 1267 Committee’s updates.25 The European measures
include the freezing of funds and of other financial assets of Osama bin Laden
and individuals and entities associated with him, as designated by the 1267
Committee. UN sanctions were further implemented by the European Council
with Regulation (EC) No 467/2001, which prohibited the export of certain goods
20  A detailed review of all the acts adopted by the EU institutions to implement UN sanctions is provided
by Tappeiner, above n 5, 102-10, as well as by Vennemann, above n 1, 219-29.
21 Under Resolution 1267, adopted on 15 October 1999, the Security Council required that the Taliban
hand over Osama bin Laden to the appropriate authorities. To this end, para 4(b) of this resolution
required that all the states ‘freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking
owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the [1267 Sanctions] Committee’, established by
para 6 of the same resolution. The Council further imposed on states an obligation to ensure that neither
the said funds ‘nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are made available, by their
nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any undertaking
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may be authorised by the Committee
on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian need’.
22 In para 8 (c) of this resolution the Council asked all states to freeze without delay funds and other
financial assets of Osama bin Laden, as well as individuals and entities associated with him, and to
ensure that funds of financial resources be made available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of
Osama bin Laden, his associates or any entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by Osama
bin Laden or individuals and entities associated with him, including the Al Qa’ida organisation.
Furthermore, the Security Council instructed the Sanctions Committee to maintain an updated list, based
on information provided by the states and regional organisations, of the individuals and entities
designated as associated with Osama bin Laden, including those in the Al Qa’ida organisation. In para 17,
the Security Council called upon all states and all international and regional organisations, including
the UN and its specialised agencies, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the resolution,
notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international
agreement. The measures adopted were established for 12 months and it was for the Security Council
to decide, at the end of that period, whether to extend them for a further period on the same conditions.
23  CFSP is the acronym for ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, indicating pillar two of the EU,
whereas ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ (JHA) constitutes the third pillar. They are regulated under arts
11-28 of the EU Treaty (Title V) and arts 29-42 (Title VI), respectively. It must be noted that the second
and third pillars share the same institutions of the EC, but all decisions must be made unanimously, for
instance, the common positions. See Steiner, Woods and Twigg-Flesner, above n 19, 9. The said pillars
are entirely based on inter-governmental cooperation among the member states, and therefore acts of
a Community nature may never be adopted in these fields (see the synopsis on ‘The Union’s founding
principles’ in the EU official website, <http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/legislation_en.htm>).
24 The first pillar of the EU has absorbed the European Communities and their traditional fields of
activity and competence.
25 In order to impose the sanctions established under SC Resolution 1267, the Council adopted on
15 November 1999 Common Position 1999/727/CFSP, concerning restrictive measures against the Taliban.
The measures were subsequently defined by the Council in Regulation (EC) No 337/2000 concerning a
flight ban and the freezing of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan.
In February 2001, the Council adopted Common Position 2001/154/CFSP, which implemented UN
Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000).
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and services to Afghanistan, strengthened the flight ban and extended the
freezing of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of
Afghanistan.26
On 27 May 2002, in order to implement Security Council Resolution 1390 (2002)27
the European Council adopted Common Position 2002/402/CFSP, concerning
restrictive measures against Osama bin Laden, members of the Al Qa’ida
organisation, the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities
associated with them.28  On the same day, the European Council adopted
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, repealing its previous regulations on the subject.29
A separate path was followed by the Security Council with the adoption of
Resolution 1373 (2001) immediately after the attacks of 9/11.30 The new regime
of sanctions thereby created was implemented by the European Council through
two common positions adopted on 27 December 2001 (the most relevant being
26 Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 of 6 March 2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services
to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources
in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 337/200 [2001] OJ L 67/1. It
was not until 8 March 2001 that the 1267 Committee published the first consolidated list of the entities
and the persons to be subjected to the freezing of funds, pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1267
(1999) and 1333 (2000). This list has since been amended and supplemented several times, so the
Commission adopted various regulations pursuant to art 10 of Regulation No 467/2001 in order to amend
Annex 1.
27  Resolution 1390 (2002) laid down new measures to be directed against Osama bin Laden, members
of the Al Qa’ida network and the Taliban and other associated individuals, groups, undertakings and
entities.
28 Council Common Position 2002/402/CFSP of 29 May 2002 concerning restrictive measures against Osama
bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organisation and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings
and entities associated with them and repealing Common Positions 96/746/CFSP, 1999/727/CFSP,
2001/154/CFSP and 2001/771/CFSP [2002] OJ L 139/4. Art 3 of the common position prescribed the
continuation of the freezing of the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of the
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities referred to in the list drawn up by the Sanctions Committee
in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000). In accordance with para 3
of Resolution 1390 (2002), the measures adopted must be maintained and then reviewed by the Security
Council 12 months after their adoption, at the end of which period the Council must either allow those
measures to continue or decide to improve them.
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures
directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and
the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and
services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial
resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan [2002] OJ L 139/9.
30  Resolution 1373 (2001) obliges states to freeze all assets and other economic and financial resources
of those who commit acts of terrorism or attempt to commit them, or who take part in them or who
facilitate the carrying out of these acts. Furthermore, states have to take steps that forbid assets and
other economic and financial resources, as well as other financial and allied services, from being made
available to these persons.
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Common Position 2000/931),31  as well as through Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.32
Under this regime, the procedure leading to a measure to freeze funds takes
place first at the national level and then at the Community level. Whereas in the
first phase a ‘competent national authority’, which in principle must be judicial,
takes a decision to include a certain party in the list, in the second phase the
European Council must decide on the actual inclusion, on the basis of precise
information or material in the relevant file transmitted by the national authority.33
As soon as the two UN sanctions regimes entered into operation, it became
manifest that the listing and de-listing procedures lacked transparency and failed
to safeguard what may be called due process rights. Even though a de-listing
procedure is set up under the sanctions regime, individuals and entities are not
allowed to petition the committees for de-listing, nor are they granted a hearing.34
Petitions for de-listing may be submitted only to governments, which may in
turn bring the issue to the attention of the committee. However, any decision
concerning de-listing would still be left to the discretion of the committee or of
the Security Council.35 The 1267 Committee therefore adopted, in November
2002, written guidelines for inclusion in and removal from the list.36  Shortly
thereafter, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1452 (2002), which provided
for a number of derogations from, and exceptions to, the freezing of funds and
economic resources imposed by its previous resolutions. Such derogations and
exceptions were to be decided by member states on ‘humanitarian grounds’ and
with the Sanctions Committee’s consent.37  Just as in the previous phases, the
31 Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism
(2001/931/CFSP) [2001] OJ L 344/93. This common position includes an Annex with a list to be ‘drawn
up on the basis of precise information or material in the relevant file which indicates that a decision
has been taken by a competent authority in respect of the person, groups and entities concerned,
irrespective of whether it concerns the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act,
an attempt to perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and credible evidence
or clues, or condemnation for such deeds’ (art 1 (4)).
32 Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed
against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism [2001] OJ L 344/70.
33 See, most notably, arts 1 (4) (‘the initial decision to freeze funds’) and 1 (6) (‘subsequent decisions to
freeze funds’) of Common Position 2001/931, as well as art 2 (3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.
34  See, generally, Bierstecker and Eckert, above n 1, 34-7; as to the 1267 Committee, see also Fassbender,
above n 1, 4.
35  Ibid.
36  Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida
and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of
its Work (as amended on 29 November 2006) (2002) United Nations
<www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf>. The guidelines provide, inter alia, that
submission of names should, to the extent possible, include a statement of the basis for the designation,
generally focusing on the connection between the individual and Al Qa’ida, the Taliban, or Osama bin
Laden, together with identifying information for use by the national authorities who must implement
the sanctions.
37  On this point, see G Burci, ‘Interpreting the Humanitarian Exceptions through the Sanctions
Committees’ in Gowlland-Debbas (ed), above n 1, 143; E de Wet, ‘Human Rights Limitations to Economic
Enforcement Measures Under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and the Iraqi Sanctions Regime’
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implementation of further Security Council resolutions involved the adoption
by the European Council of a new Common Position (2003/140/CFSP) and of
further amendments to Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, thus introducing a system
of exceptions to the restrictive measures previously imposed.38
Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 and its consolidated list,39 which are part of the
1267 sanctions regime against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and Al Qa’ida, are
the object of most of the lawsuits discussed in this paper. Other complaints were
filed against Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, and are therefore within the
framework of the 1373 sanctions regime. As the remainder of this paper will
show, the Court has dealt with the two different sanctions regimes in very
different ways in terms of the judicial review which it is prepared to offer to
individuals and entities targeted by the measures.
III. Challenging the European Union Sanctions before the
Court of First Instance/European Court of Justice
Since 2001, the legality of the counter-terrorism sanctions adopted under the
different EU pillars has, on several occasions, been challenged before the CFI.
The plaintiffs are individuals resident, or entities incorporated, in both EU and
non-EU states, such as Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and Saudi Arabia, and
whose names were included in Annex 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002,
or in Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001.40  In all the cases considered, applicants
have not only challenged the Community’s competence to adopt the contested
regulations, but they have also asked the Court to declare these acts invalid,
alleging violations of fundamental human rights, as protected by Community
law. This paper aims to cover some of the legal issues concerning the protection
of the applicant’s human rights.
As to the jurisdictional questions, for the purposes of my analysis I will only
note that most of the relevant cases arise from ‘annulment actions’ brought by
individuals (natural or legal persons) under Article 230 of the EC Treaty. An
individual may only challenge a decision addressed to him/herself or a decision
(2001) 14 Leiden Journal of International Law 277, 281-4; and more recently, Bierstecker and Eckert,
above n 1, 31-3.
38 Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain
persons and entities associated with Usama Bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban [2003] OJ L
81/1.
39 By the end of 2006, the regulation and the attached list had been amended more than 60 times, both
by the Council and by the Commission.
40  See, respectively, above nn 38 and 32. When analysing EU counter-terrorism sanctions, some
commentators have highlighted the distinction between European (or ‘EU internal’) terrorists and
non-European (or ‘EU external’) terrorists, especially in light of Common Position 2001/931. According
to this argument, whereas the Council Decisions of June 2002, implementing Regulation 2580/2001,
only list ‘EU external’ terrorists, the list annexed to Common Position 2001/931 include both internal
and external terrorists (see, for instance, Reinisch, above n 1, 130). However, this dichotomy is far from
being clear-cut, as shown by Tappeiner, above n 5, 109-10.
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‘which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another
person, is of direct and individual concern to the former’.41 The other form of
individual direct action before the ECJ against Community institutions is action
seeking compensation for any damage that may have been caused by a
Community act.42  However, in a couple of cases the CFI rejected applications
for compensation, lodged by organisations (Segi and Others and Gestoras
Pro-Aministía, respectively) blacklisted by the European Council when
implementing Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).43 The Court concluded
that it could not afford judicial review to the applicants, because it lacks
jurisdiction to examine complaints against acts adopted under Title VI of the
EU Treaty (JHA or third pillar).44
As to the merits of individuals’ actions for annulment, the applicants usually
claim that the EU decisions to freeze their funds, and all related subsequent
decisions, are never communicated to them in advance. Also, the decisions never
mention the specific information allegedly provided by a competent national
authority in order to justify the inclusion of individuals and organisations in
the disputed list, therefore the right to a fair hearing does not seem to be
protected. Persons affected by decisions of public authorities must be given the
right to put their case, in particular with respect to the correctness and the
relevance of the facts and the circumstances alleged as well as to the evidence
adduced. The principle of due process of law, which encompasses both the right
to be heard and the right to effective judicial protection, presupposes the
existence of courts and tribunals, which are impartial and independent of the
executive power.45
41 Art 230 (4) EC Treaty [emphasis added].
42 This is regulated under art 288 EC Treaty.
43 The two organisations filed two distinct applications for damages as compensation for damage
allegedly suffered as a result of their inclusion in the list attached to Common Position 2001/931 (referred
to above, n 31) as well as to other acts applying specific measures to combat terrorism (Action brought
on 31 October 2002 by the Gestoras Pro Amnistía association, Juan Mari Olano Olano and Julen Zelarain
Errasti against Council of the European Union (T-333/02) [2003] OJ C 19/36; Action brought on 13 November
2002 by the SEGI association, Araitz Zubimnedi Izaga and Aritza Galarraga against Council of the European
Union (T-338/02) [2003] OJ C 7/24).
44 Even though Common Position 2001/931 was adopted under the CFSP heading, the Court found in
an Order of 7 June 2004 that the applicants were only affected by its art 4, which entails measures
falling within the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (JHA) (Segi and Others v
Council of the European Union, (T-338/02) [2004] II-1647 [33]). Since the Community legal system is based
on the principle of conferred powers (see art 5 EU Treaty) and the ECJ powers are listed exhaustively
under art 46 EU Treaty, the Court concluded that no judicial remedy for compensation is available in
the context of Title VI of the EU Treaty (JHA) [34]. On the other hand, ‘[t]he Community courts have
jurisdiction over the present action for damages in so far as the applicants allege failure to observe the
powers of the Community’ [41]. See, in the same sense, the order delivered on the same date in the case
Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v Council of the European Union (T-333/02) (unreported; a summary
of the order is available in [2004] OJ C 228/40).
45  Fassbender, above n 1, 6. Although these rights were first developed in the context of criminal
justice, where the principle of fairness of the legal process is of particular relevance, they are nowadays
seen as relevant each time fundamental human rights are at stake. On these aspects, it is appropriate to
refer to the reasoning of the ECrtHR in the seminal judgment delivered in the Golder Case (1975) 18 Eur
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As is well known, the case law of the ECJ gradually built up a framework for
human rights protection, in the absence of any general provision in the EC Treaty
on the protection of fundamental rights.46  Only with the Maastricht Treaty were
the constitutional traditions and the international human rights obligations of
member states formally integrated into the legal order of the EU itself.47
According to Article 6 (1) of the EU Treaty, the Union is founded on the principles
of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
the rule of law. Under Article 6 (2), the Union is bound to respect fundamental
rights as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and as they
derive from the constitutional traditions common to the member states, as general
principles of Community law. General principles of Community law are
‘unwritten principles used by the Court to supplement the Treaties and acts of
the institutions’ and to ensure that ‘Community law reflects and is firmly rooted
in the basic legal values of the Member States’.48  It has correctly been noted
that, although no human rights treaty is directly binding upon the EU and its
institutions, the CFI and the ECJ normally rely on the ECHR when reconstructing
general principles in the field.49
The principle of respect for fundamental human rights is the measure of legality
of EU anti-terrorist sanctions relevant for the purposes of this chapter.50 In
Court HR (ser A) 4, 12-8. See also the recent analysis by Cameron, above n 1, 7-10, on aspects of due
process in criminal matters, civil matters and with respect to blacklisting in general. He correctly
highlights that ‘UN blacklisting does not fit into this more traditional pattern of due process. It bears
a superficial similarity to interim seizure of assets pending a trial, but it is in fact entirely different. …
at the UN level, the freezing measures are alternatives to criminal investigations, not adjuncts’.
46  See, ex multis, F G Jacobs, ‘European Community Law and the European Convention on Human
Rights’ in D Curtin and T Heukels (eds), Institutional Dynamics of European Integration (Essays in Honour
of Henry G. Schermers) (Dordrecht, Boston: M Nijhoff, 1994), 561; A Arnull, The European Union and
its Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed 2006) 337-66. Notwithstanding the absence
of provisions of a general scope on the protection of fundamental human rights, the EC Treaty of 1957
specifically prohibited discriminatory practices based on grounds of nationality or gender.
47  A discussion of the hierarchy of sources in the EU system is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.
May I just refer to the following passage by Giorgio Gaja, ‘The Protection of Human Rights under the
Maastricht Treaty’, in D Curtin and T Heukels (eds), above n 46, 549, 551-52: ‘the constant
characterization by the [ECJ] of fundamental rights as “an integral part of the general principles of law”
appears to locate the protection of human rights at a level which is higher than Community secondary
legislation, but lower that the Treaty establishing the Communities’ [footnotes omitted].
48  Arnull, above n 46, 335.
49 T Ahmed and I de Jesús Butler, ‘The European Union and Human Rights: An International Law
Perspective’ (2006) European Journal of International Law 771, 774-5, 780.
50 More recently, the constitutional traditions common to the member states and the standards of the
ECHR as interpreted by the ECrtHR and by the Community courts have been drawn on in the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereafter, the EU Charter, the full text of which is
published in [2000] OJ C 364/1), an instrument signed by all member states but not yet ratified. I will
note that, according to art II-112 of the EU Treaty, ‘[i]nsofar as this Charter contains rights which
correspond to rights guaranteed by the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by
the said Convention.’ The relevant part for our analysis is Chapter VI (art 47-50), under the heading of
‘Justice’. Most notably, art 47 codifies the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, whereas art 48
deals with the presumption of innocence and the right of defence.
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particular, the right to a fair hearing and the right to access to courts as set out
in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR are indisputably part of the general principles
of Community law.51
However, the CFI has shown a certain reluctance to exercise judicial review. As
early as December 2001, two actions under Article 230 EC were brought by
different applicants (to whom I will refer as Yusuf and Kadi, respectively) against
the European Council, asking the Court to annul Regulation (EC) No 881/2002,
whose Annex 1 listed the applicants as targets of restrictive measures.52  Most
notably, Yusuf and Kadi alleged the infringement of their right to use property,
of their right to a fair hearing and of their right to an effective judicial remedy.53
51  See, for instance, Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [192]. For further discussion see, inter alia, C
Harlow, ‘Access to Justice as a Human Right: The European Convention and the European Union’ in P
Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) 187. Art 6
of the ECHR reads, in the relevant parts:
1. ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law …
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him;
b. to have adequate time and facilities in the preparation of his defence;
c. to defend himself in person or through the legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has
not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice
so require;
d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language
used in court.’
Under art 13 of the ECHR: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’
Summing up, the main aspects of the due process rights protected by the ECHR are (i) the right to
procedural fairness, (ii) the presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings, (iii) specific rights for
persons accused of criminal offences, including the right to be informed of the charge and the right to
be tried within a reasonable time and (iv) the right to be free from retrospective criminal law (art 7
ECHR). These rights must be read in conjunction with other corollaries of the principle of fair trial,
most notably: the right not to be deprived of liberty unless in accordance with a procedure described
by law (art 5 (1) ECHR); the right of appeal in criminal matters (7th Protocol to the ECHR, art 2); the right
to compensation for wrongful conviction (7th Protocol to the ECHR, art 3); the right not to be tried twice
for the same offence (7th Protocol to the ECHR, art 4).
52 Action brought on 10 December 2001 by Abdirisak Aden and Others against the Council of the European
Union and the Commission of the European Communities and Action brought on 18 December 2001 by Yassin
Abdullah Kadi against the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities
[2002] OJ C 56/16. The applications were originally brought against both the Commission and the
Council; however, the CFI ruled that, on account of the repeal of some acts adopted by the Commission,
the action had to be regarded as being brought against the Council alone (Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR
II-3533 [71]-[77]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [52]-[8]).
53  Infringements of the right to property are also the object of most of the lawsuits considered in this
chapter. Both the domestic legislation of most European states and customary international law require
that interferences with individual property be in principle grounded on judicial findings and not on
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In two nearly identical judgments handed down on 21 September 2005, the CFI
held that it lacked jurisdiction to review EC sanctions implementing Security
Council Resolution 1267 (1999), because it had no jurisdiction to review the
legality of the latter; it thus rejected all the pleas.54
Only the pleas concerning the breach of the applicants’ fundamental rights will
be dealt with in this chapter. In light of Yusuf and Kadi and subsequent cases,
I will now assess the way in which the Court interpreted its power to review
the legality of the contested EC regulation (A). I will then analyse the alleged
breach of the applicants’ right to a fair hearing and to an effective judicial
remedy, when 1267 sanctions are implemented at the EU level (B). Interestingly,
the Court has concluded, in a more recent case, that an essential guarantee for
the protection of the applicants’ rights is their right to diplomatic protection
(C). Lastly, I will turn to a case relating to the protection of human rights with
respect to the implementation of the 1373 sanctions regime (D).
A. The Court’s Jurisdiction, the Primacy of the United
Nations Legal Order and the Role of Jus Cogens in the
Protection of Human Rights
The Kadi and Yusuf cases presented the CFI with the opportunity to discuss
several issues of EU law and international law, including: the legal basis for
counter-terrorism measures in EU and EC law;55  the obligations of the EU and
of its member states resulting from the UN Charter and Security Council
administrative procedures, such as the procedures of the 1267 Committee. Violations of the right to
privacy and to the protection of personal information of the targeted individuals and organisations may
also be considered when analysing the judicial review of EU counter-terrorism measures. See Bianchi,
‘Security Council’s Anti-terror Resolutions and their Implementation by Member States’, above n 1,
1064-9.
54 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 and Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649. For comments on various
aspects of the two judgments see, inter alia, Steve Peers, ‘First EU Court Ruling on Terrorist Lists’ (2005)
Statewatch <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/sep/10terrorlists.htm>; C Tomuschat, ‘Ahmed Ali
Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission: Case Note’ (2006) 43
Common Market Law Review 537; B Conforti, above n 12, 333; A Gianelli, ‘Il rapporto tra diritto
internazionale e diritto comunitario secondo il Tribunale di primo grado delle Comunità Europee’ (2006)
89 Rivista di diritto internazionale 131; L Pech, ‘Trying to Have it Both Ways: On the First Judgments
of the Court of First Instance Concerning EC Acts Adopted in the Fight against International Terrorism’
(2007) 1 Irish Human Rights Law Review 1 (available on the SSRN database:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=915386>).
55 The first ground of annulment put forward by the applicants was the Council’s incompetence to
adopt the contested regulation. The position of the CFI on this point may be summarised as follows
(Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [108]-[66]). Whereas arts 60 and 301 EC Treaty constitute in
themselves a sufficient basis for the adoption of restrictive measures against the rulers of a third state
(ie, the Taliban of Afghanistan), and thus the measures laid down by Regulation No 467/2001 come
within the power of the Community; the legal basis for the parts of the same regulation that impose
economic and financial sanctions on individuals not presenting a link with a third state may not be
found in the said articles if taken in isolation, because the powers to adopt economic sanctions do not
encompass the interruption of economic relations with third states. It is thus necessary to read these
articles together with art 308 EC Treaty (on residual powers of the Community), in order to have an
appropriate joint legal basis, notwithstanding the fact that the adoption of ‘smart sanctions’ against
individuals or entities is not part of any power expressly attributed to the Community.
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resolutions; the Court’s power to review the lawfulness of UN sanctions; the
scope of the applicants’ right to a hearing and of the right to judicial review.
With regard to the breach of the right to a hearing, the applicants’ submission
was that the European Council never examined the reasons for their listing, first
by the states and then by the Sanctions Committee.56 The plaintiffs alleged that
‘[t]he entire procedure leading to the addition of the applicants to the list in
Annex 1 to the contested regulation is … stamped with the seal of secrecy.’57
The challenges to the EU sanctions were rejected in light of the Court’s
interpretation of the relationship between the UN Charter and Community law.
According to the CFI, although it is undisputed that the Community is based on
the rule of law and that all acts of its institutions may be reviewed by the Court,
member states’ obligations under the UN Charter and Security Council’s
resolutions must nevertheless prevail over all other conventional obligations,
including obligations under the EC Treaty and under the ECHR.58  In other
words, the principle of primacy of the UN legal order and of the Charter’s
obligations, as expressed by Article 103 of the Charter, sets the scene for the
Court’s analysis of its power to entertain the claims. The Court’s line of reasoning
implies, first, that the Community itself, although not a UN Member, is bound
by obligations stemming from UN Security Council’s resolutions, to the extent
that the Community’s member states are bound by such resolutions and must
comply with them also in their dealings with the Community.59 This means that
the Community, in exercising its powers, is required to adopt all necessary
provisions to allow its member states to fulfil their obligations, including the
obligation to implement UN counter-terrorism sanctions.60
The second limb of the CFI’s reasoning stems from the circumstance that the
European Council, when adopting the contested EC regulation, was acting ‘under
circumscribed powers [and] had no autonomous discretion’.61 Thus, the Court
considers that:
[a]ny review of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation, … would
… imply that the Court is to consider, indirectly, the lawfulness of [Security
56 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [191] (Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation, during
argument); Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [141]-[5].
57 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [191]. It must be noted that EC regulations No 467/2001 and No
881/2002 do not make clear, unlike Common Position 2001/931 and Regulation 2580/2001, that ‘competent
authority’ for blacklisting individuals and entities ‘shall mean a judicial authority, or, where judicial
authorities have no competence in the area covered by this paragraph, an equivalent competent authority
in that area’ [emphasis added].
58  Ibid [231]-[34]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [181]-[84].
59  States’ obligations discussed here stem from arts 25, 48 and 103 of the UN Charter.
60 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [254]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [204]. Several scholars
have commented upon this extension of the monist idea of hierarchy between the Community legal
system and member states’ legal systems to the relationship between UN law and Community law. See,
for instance, Tomuschat, above n 54, 540; Lavranos, above n 5, 475.
61 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [265]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [214].
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Council] resolutions [given that] the origin of the illegality alleged by the
applicant would have to be sought not in the adoption of the contested regulation
but in the resolutions of the Security Council which imposed the sanctions.62
As a consequence, the Court saw no other option than to refrain from exercising
any judicial review of the Community measures, as it lacks power to review
judicially the underlying Security Council’s resolutions,63  and thus rejected the
applicants’ claims.64
The third limb of the CFI reasoning further complicates an already disputable
argument, since the Court notes that the (indirect) exercise of judicial review of
the Security Council’s resolution would still be an option in all cases of alleged
violations of fundamental rights guaranteed by peremptory norms of international
law (jus cogens).65
One is left with the impression that some of the elements of the test outlined by
the Court were not really necessary. Indeed, the Court had simply been asked
to examine the compatibility of a regulation, implementing UN sanctions, with
primary Community law, which includes the EC Treaty and fundamental rights
as protected by the constitutional traditions common to member states and by
the ECHR. Thus, it does not seem that the Court had any truly persuasive reason
not to exercise judicial control of the observance of Community law by
Community institutions, under Article 220 EC Treaty.66  It is difficult to see what
would have really prevented the Court from invalidating the contested regulation
with respect to the applicants, had such regulation been found to violate
procedural and substantive rights guaranteed under Community law, without
adjudicating on the legality of Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999). As we
will see, the Court has moved towards this approach in the more recent OMPI
Case.67
A different outcome would have been welcome especially as the Court itself
notes the lack of other avenues of judicial review open to the applicants.68  One
wonders where else targeted individuals and entities might seek legal protection.
The Court’s reasoning seems to be in conflict with the principle that ‘access to
justice is one of the constitutive elements of a Community based on the rule of
law and is guaranteed in the legal order based on the EC Treaty’.69
62 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [266]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [215].
63 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [276]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [224].
64 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [346]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [291].
65 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [277]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [226].
66  See Lavranos, above n 5, 474-9.
67  Analysed below, subparagraph D.
68 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [339]-[40] and Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [284]-[5].
69  See Philip Morris International v Commission  (T-377/00) [2003] ECR II-1 [121].
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It is true that invoking the primacy of UN law in order to exclude any judicial
review of Community acts by the CFI seems in line with the Bosphorus Case,
where the ECJ affirmed that the exercise of fundamental rights may be subject
to restrictions justified by objectives of general interest pursued by the
Community, for instance the effective implementation of UN sanctions.70
However, the consolidation of this jurisprudence is a source of concern if one
considers that the ECrtHR, in its more recent cases, has concluded that in future
cases it would exercise its jurisdiction only where the protection of fundamental
rights within the EC is ‘manifestly deficient’.71  One commentator has labelled
this reluctance of both the ECJ and the ECrtHR to exercise jurisdiction in such
cases as a ‘common hands-off approach’.72
Another problematic aspect of the ratio decidendi in the cases at hand is that the
threshold triggering the CFI’s powers of (indirect) judicial review of UN
resolutions is a violation of jus cogens rules.73  However, not all fundamental
rights are the subject of protection by peremptory rules of international law.74
The jurisprudence of the ICJ does not offer clear guidance on this point.75 The
70  Above n 14, [22]-[6].
71 Bosphorus v Ireland [2005] 42 E.H.R.R. 1 [156]. After the ECJ delivered its judgment in this case
(Bosphorus, above n 14), the applicants brought the case before the ECrtHR and instituted proceedings
against Ireland, alleging a violation of the right to property, as guaranteed under art 1 of Protocol I to
the ECHR. See the case note by Steve Peers, ‘Limited responsibility of European Union member States
for actions within the scope of Community Law’ (2006) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 443.
72  Lavranos, above n 5, 475.
73  E de Wet, ‘Holding the UN Security Council Accountable for Human Rights Violations: A Role for
Domestic and Regional Courts?’, (Paper presented at the Workshop on Connecting the Public with the
International: Law’s Potential, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2-4 July, on file with
author).
74  See Pech, above n 5, [9], who argues that the notion of jus cogens ‘does not seems warranted and is
certainly rather perilous in practice’.
75 With the exception of the recent judgment handed down on 3 February 2006 in the dispute opposing
the DRC and Rwanda (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application 2002) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Rwanda), [2006] [74], available at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf>), the ICJ has never expressly mentioned jus cogens
in its case law. The exact scope of jus cogens norms at international law cannot be determined precisely,
although there is a general consensus that the notion encompasses norms protecting fundamental
interests of the international community, eg, the norms prohibiting aggression, slavery, genocide,
apartheid, torture, the use or threat of force, as well as most norms of international humanitarian law,
in particular those prohibiting war crimes and crimes against humanity (see A Cassese, International
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2005) 202-3). This being said, there is certainly an argument
in favour of the CFI’s choice of the jus cogens test, because in the legal doctrine there seems to be a broad
agreement to the effect that jus cogens does indeed limit the authority of the Security Council, most
notably when the protection of fundamental human rights is at stake: see, generally, the recent study
of A Orakhelashvili, ‘The Impact of Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 59. In the Bosnia
case, Judge Lauterpacht rightly emphasised in his separate opinion that the UN Security Council is
bound by peremptory norms of international law and that ‘it is not to be contemplated that the Security
Council would ever deliberately adopt a resolution clearly and deliberately flouting a rule of jus cogens
or requiring a violation of human rights’ (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Order of 16 September 1993)
[1993] ICJ Rep 440-1).
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CFI simply defines jus cogens as ‘a body of higher rules of public international
law binding on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the
United Nations, and from which no derogation is possible’.76  One may, on the
one hand, welcome the CFI’s message to the Security Council, defining the limits
within which the Court would unconditionally accept the exercise by the latter
of its powers in the counter-terrorism field.77  However, an element of uncertainty
is thereby introduced, because the standard of jus cogens is not a well-established
feature of the case law of the ECJ in the field of human rights protection.78  It is
not clear how applicants may be able to prove before the CFI whether jus cogens
norms are at stake or not in a given case.79
B. Assessing the Alleged Human Rights Violations:
Inconsistencies in the Jus Cogens Test
It is now time to discuss in more depth the way in which the jus cogens  test is
applied by the Court, in order to assess (and dismiss) the applicants’ claims
against the EC regulations. It is where the ECJ deals with the rights allegedly
violated by the EC regulation that the jus cogens test reveals its weaknesses. For
instance, the Court finds that the right to property may be regarded as protected
by jus cogens when arbitrary deprivations are involved.80 The Court thereby
broadens the scope of peremptory norms, which do not traditionally seem to
cover the right to property.81 The discussion of jus cogens appears even less
convincing with reference to the right to a fair hearing and the right to an
effective judicial remedy, to which I now turn.
1. Right to a Fair Hearing
The authority provided by the Court when analysing the right to a fair hearing
is quite scant. The Court makes passing reference to the ‘complete system of
legal remedies and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to review
76 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [277] and Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [226].
77  See Lavranos, above n 5, 485. Pech, above n 54, [17], quoting other commentators, argues that the
two cases discussed here apply by analogy the line of reasoning of the German Federal Constitutional
Court in 1974 in the Solange I  judgment (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, reported in (1974) 2 Common Market Law Review 540). The
German Constitutional Court reserved for itself the power of reviewing and setting aside EC secondary
legislation, where this would be found to violate fundamental rights protected in the German legal
system. In the same vein, so Pech’s arguments runs, the CFI may be sending a message to the Security
Council expressing its intention to offer judicial review each time that fundamental rights protected
under EU and EC law are sacrificed by the Security Council to other interests. Gianelli, above n 54, 139,
argues that the Kadi and Yusuf judgments may play a significant role, hopefully, in inducing the ICJ
to deal with jus cogens in a bolder way.
78  According to Peers, above n 54 ‘[t]his is believed to be the first time that an EU Court has even
referred to the principle of ‘jus cogens’, never mind applied it to a specific case.’
79  For instance, Lavranos, above n 5, 476, argues that such an element would be impossible to prove
before the ECJ.
80 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [293].
81  See for instance de Wet, above n 73.
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the legality of acts of the institutions’, based on its own case law and on the
ECHR;82  it also clarifies that observance of the right to a fair hearing is today a
fundamental principle of Community law, as it emerges from the Court’s case
law.83  However, despite lengthy discussion of other matters, the Court does not
address the content of the right to a fair hearing as jus cogens,84  because at each
passage of its reasoning it emphasises the exception rather than the rule, thereby
restricting the procedural right in the present cases.85
The Court’s main point is that for cases of counter-terrorism sanctions the right
to a hearing must be weighed against the consideration that an advance warning
to targeted individuals and entities would help the latter to relocate their funds
and thus nullify the ‘surprise effect’.86  In the Court’s view, this limitation is
admissible because ‘it appears that no mandatory rule of public international
law requires a prior hearing for the persons concerned in circumstances such as
those of this case’,87  that is, counter-terrorism sanctions adopted by the Security
Council under Chapter VII. The Court emphasises that there are still safeguards,
offered in the first place by the periodical re-examination of the contested
decision by the issuing authority,88  and then by the (additional) possibility of
petitioning the Sanctions Committee through the applicants’ respective state of
residence or citizenship.89  Although this is a restriction of the right to be heard
(because the applicants were not heard before the adoption of the Security
82 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [260]-[1]; ‘As the Court has repeatedly held … “judicial control
… reflects a general principle of law which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States … and which is also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the [ECHR]”.’
83  Ibid [325].
84 The lack of a clear position of the Court on this point has been interpreted in completely opposite
ways by the doctrine. To give just two examples, whereas Tomuschat, above n 54, 549, says that ‘the
Court does not even make an attempt to show that [the right to a hearing] might have the nature of jus
cogens’; Ahmed and de Jesús Butler, above n 49, 780, have no doubt that ‘[p]erhaps overgenerously,
the Court of First Instance (CFI) recently appeared to consider all human rights [including the right to
a hearing] to have attained the status of jus cogens in international law.’
85 It is generally acknowledged that art 6 ECHR ‘is concerned, not with substantive, but with procedural
due process’, which implies that the ECrtHR ‘may not substitute its own assessment of the facts for that
of domestic courts. Its task is to “ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the way
evidence was taken, were fair”.’ (Leonard Leigh, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial and the European Convention
on Human Rights’ in D Weissbrodt and R Wolfrum (eds), The Right to a Fair Trial (Berlin, New York:
Springer, 1997) 645, 646-7, quoting the ECrtHR judgment in Edwards v United Kingdom (1992)).
86  ‘[A prior hearing would] jeopardise the effectiveness of the sanctions and would [be] incompatible
with the public interest objective pursued’ (Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [308]).
87  Ibid [307].
88 The Court refers here to the circumstance that Resolution 1390 (2002) provides that measures such
as the freezing of funds, imposed by the previous resolutions, must be reviewed by the Security Council
12 months after their adoption. The options following such review include the decision to allow those
measures to continue, or to improve them (see para 3 of the resolution). The same system of review of
the sanctions after 12 months is adopted under Resolution 1455 (2003), adopted one year later (see para 2
of the resolution).
89 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [309]-[11], 345]; Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [263]-[64],
[290].
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Council sanctions and of the EC regulations),90  such restriction, in the Court’s
view, is not ‘to be deemed improper in the light of the mandatory prescriptions
of international law’.91
The decisive element leading the Court to dismiss the alleged violation of the
right to a hearing is the circumstance that, according to the Court’s settled case
law, the exercise by the Community of a power of appraisal is the prerequisite
for the obligation to respect the procedural rights guaranteed by the Community
legal order, including the right to a hearing.92  Since the European Council does
not enjoy any powers of investigation and inquiry when transposing the Security
Council’s decision into an EC sanction, a hearing before the enactment of the
contested regulations would be pointless:
[T]he Community institutions were required to transpose into the Community
legal order resolutions of the Security Council and the decisions of the Sanctions
Committee in no way authorised [the Community institutions], at the time of
actual implementation, to provide for any Community mechanism whatsoever
for the examination or re-examination of individual situations, since both the
substance of the measures in question and the mechanisms for re-examination
… fell wholly within the purview of the Security Council and its Sanctions
Committee. As a result, the Community institutions had no power of
investigation, no opportunity to check the matters taken to be facts by the
Security Council and the Sanctions Committee, no discretion with regard to
those matters and no discretion either as to whether it was appropriate to adopt
sanctions vis-à-vis the applicants. The principle of Community law relating to
the right to be heard cannot apply in such circumstances, where to hear the
person concerned could not in any case lead the institutions to review its position.93
2. The Right to an Effective Judicial Remedy
The Court then turns to a discussion of the claim concerning the appellants’
right to an effective judicial remedy and applies the jus cogens test in an
90  In the Court’s words, ‘[t]he fact remains that any opportunity for the applicants effectively to make
known their views on the correctness and the relevance of the facts in consideration of which their
funds have been frozen and on the evidence adduced against them appears to be definitely excluded.
Those facts and that evidence, once classified as confidential or secret by the State which made the
Sanctions Committee aware of them, are not, obviously, communicated to them, any more than they
are to the Member States of the United Nations to which the Security Council’s resolutions are addressed.’
Ibid [319].
91 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [315] [emphasis added].
92  Ibid [327].
93 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [328] [emphasis added]. The Court followed, on this point, the
European Council’s submission, based on the need to give effect to Chapter VII resolutions of the UN
Security Council. In the European Council’s view, doing otherwise would constitute an infringement
of member states’ international obligations. Furthermore, the lack of any autonomous discretion of the
European Council would preclude any unlawful conduct on its part. See Ibid [205]-[17] (the European
Council, during argument); Kadi (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [160] and comments by Pech, above n
54, [15].
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unconvincing way. The argument based on the need to respect the Security
Council’s prerogatives under Chapter VII of the Charter seems to be the decisive
one here. The judges limit themselves to noting that, even though there is no
other judicial remedy available to the applicants, ‘any such lacuna in judicial
protection is not in itself contrary to jus cogens’,94  because the limitation is
justified by the nature and the objective of Security Council decisions.95  In
other words, the Court argues that the jus cogens norm on the right to an effective
judicial remedy does contain in itself a limitation to the enjoyment of such a
right, that is, the exercise by the Security Council of Chapter VII powers.96  It
seems that the Court is not following coherently the jus cogens  test as originally
outlined.97  In this case, the Court would probably do better to re-frame the test
and conclude that it simply cannot offer any judicial review, under any
circumstance whatsoever, of EC decisions implementing Chapter VII sanctions.
3. Critique
The Court’s holdings on these points are hardly persuasive, particularly as it
generally appears inaccurate in its discussion of several international law points.
Two elements may be highlighted in this respect.
First, the two judgments would have benefited from a more thorough analysis
of some fundamental aspects of the universal and regional systems of human
rights protection.98  For instance, the CFI argues that proof that the right to
access to the courts is not absolute is provided on the one hand by the possibility
to derogate from it under Article 4 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),99  at a time of public emergency that threatens the life
of the nation, and on the other hand by certain restrictions inherent in the right
itself.100 The Court’s reasoning seems to be based on insufficient analysis of the
94 Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [340]-[41].
95  Ibid [270].
96 ‘In this instance, the Court considers that the limitation of the applicants’ right to access to a court,
as a result of the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed as a rule, in the domestic legal order of the Member
States of the United Nations, by resolution of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, in accordance with the relevant principles of international law (in
particular Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter), is inherent in that right as it is guaranteed by jus cogens.’
(Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [343]).
97  See above n 65.
98 For instance, on the basis of art 6 of the ECHR there was no reason why the judges might not have
analysed the right of audience and the right to judicial review as two sides of the same coin, instead of
analysing them separately, as they did. See the text of art 6, above n 51.
99 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
100 Yusuf, (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [342]. Art 4 of the ICCPR reads, in the relevant parts:
‘4. In time of emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their
obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law
and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social
origin;
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international rules on derogation from protected rights, or on limitations thereto.
To begin with, the Court’s assertion as to derogations from the right of access
to the courts (including the right to a hearing) differs with the position expressed
by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No 29:
States parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the [ICCPR] as
justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of
international law, for instance … by deviating from fundamental principles of
fair trial, including the presumption of innocence.101
Since jus cogens norms may still be subject to restrictions or exceptions in the
sense of limitations, the issue here is whether there is a permissible limitation
on the right of access to courts. The Court resorts to a ‘balance of interests’
argument, according to which the applicants’ interest in having a court hear
their case on its merits is not enough to outweigh the essential public interest
in the maintenance of international peace and security in the face of a threat
clearly identified by the Security Council.102
Some commentators have persuasively contended that ‘the balance metaphor is
inappropriate to describe the process of reconciling respect for civil liberties
and human rights with the (alleged) imperatives of … security.’103  In particular,
5. No derogation from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this
provision.’
101 Human Rights’ Committee General Comment no. 29: States of Emergency (art 4), 31 August 2001,
UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 [11] [emphasis added]. Even though the ECJ invokes the maintenance
of international peace and security as an ‘essential public interest’, this would not be enough to meet
the requirements of a ‘public emergency’, as defined by the ECrtHR when interpreting art 15 of the
ECHR, as well as by the Human Rights Committee with reference to art 4 ICCPR. See, inter alia, R Ergec,
Les droits de l’homme à l’épreuve des circonstances exceptionnelles: étude sur l’article 15 de la Convention
européenne des droits de l’homme (Brussels: Editions de lÚniversite libre de Bruxelle, 1987) 123-236 ; A
Svensson-MacCarthy, The International Law of Human Rights and States of Exception: With Special
Reference to the “Travaux Préparatoires” and Case Law of the International Monitoring Organs (The Hague,
Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1998), passim; C Michaelsen, ‘International Human Rights on Trial – The United
Kingdom’s and Australia’s Legal Response to 9/11’ (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review 275, 288-92; O Gross
and F Ní Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis (Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
247-325. Most notably, while the case law of the ECrtHR leaves a considerable amount of discretion to
a state that is trying to derogate from the conventional regime, under the ‘margin of appreciation’
doctrine (on this point, and in particular on the progressive broadening of the notion in the case law
of the ECrtHR, see O Gross and F Ní Aoláin, ‘From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application
of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention of
Human Rights’ (2001) 23 Human Rights Quarterly 625), it has been shown that ‘an overwhelming majority
of Council of Europe States have not regarded the actual terrorist threat to be of sufficient gravity to
meet the “public emergency” criteria’ of art 15 ECHR (Michaelsen, 293). According to art 15 of the
ECHR, derogation is only permissible to the extent ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.
It would be difficult to argue that the measures adopted by the Security Council under Resolutions
1267 (1999) and 1390 (2002) satisfy such conditions, especially because of the lack of a system of
independent supervision.
102 Yusuf, (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [344]; Kadi, (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [289].
103  See the debate as analysed by C Michaelsen, ‘Balancing Civil Liberties against National Security? A
Critique of Counterterrorism Rhetoric’ (2006) 29 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1, 19; for
a similar conclusion from a criminal law perspective and with reference to the ‘war on drugs’, see S
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Michaelsen has suggested replacing this metaphor with the proportionality test,
which is more consistent with the spirit and the letter of international human
rights instruments,104  so that each time derogating measures must be assessed
against particular emergencies.105 The test of proportionality is, of course, more
rigorous than the one of the balance of interests, because it is based on
requirements such as suitability, necessity and appropriateness.106
The right of access to courts as enunciated by Article 6 ECHR is not absolute
and may be subject to limitations, which must be legitimate and proportionate.107
Whether the gravity of the threat posed by international terrorism is enough to
justify limitations of access to courts as outlined by the CFI is a matter for debate.
However, there is at least a serious concern that such limitations restrict access
to courts ‘in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right
is impaired’.108  Indeed, affected individuals and entities are never put in a
position to bring potential claims to court to prove their innocence; they may
only petition their respective national states. A review mechanism resting
essentially on a government’s choice to trigger the de-listing procedure before
the Sanctions Committee, and in which the affected individuals are not granted
any standing,109  cannot constitute an appropriate solution to enforce the victims’
rights.110  In particular, the de-listing procedure cannot generally satisfy the
terms required by Article 6 (1) ECHR, which, in the words of the ECrtHR,
embodies the ‘right to a court’, meaning ‘the right to have any claim relating to
[one’s] civil rights and obligations brought before a court or a tribunal’.111
Bronitt, ‘Constitutional Rhetoric versus Criminal Justice Realities: Unbalanced Responses to Terrorism?’
(2003) 14 Public Law Review 76.
104  Michaelsen, above n 103, 20.
105  Michaelsen, above n 101, 291.
106  Michaelsen, above n 103, 20.
107 Osman v the United Kingdom (1998) VIII Eur Court HR 3169 [147]. Most notably, the ECrtHR clarifies
that limitations ‘are permitted by implication since the right of access by its very nature calls for
regulation by the State’ (ibid). For a discussion on the doctrine of inherent limitations in the system of
the ECHR, see P Van Dijk et al (ed), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights
(Deventer, London: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 4th ed, 2006) 343-50.
108  Ibid.
109  ‘Admittedly, the procedure described above confers no right directly on the persons concerned
themselves to be heard by the Sanctions Committee, the only authority competent to give a decision,
on a State’s petition, on the re-examination of their case. Those persons are thus dependent, essentially,
on the diplomatic protection afforded by the States to their nationals’ (Yusuf, (T-306/01) [2005] ECR
II-3533 [314]).
110  I do not think that this conclusion should be reconsidered in light of the Court’s consideration that
a wrongful refusal by the competent domestic authority to bring a case before the 1267 Committee may
always constitute the basis for an individual action for judicial review before domestic judges; such
action, in the Court’s view, may also be directed against the contested EC regulation and the Security
Council resolutions themselves. The point was presented by the UK at the hearing and was cursorily
mentioned by the Court in both Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [317] and Kadi (T-315/01) [2005]
ECR II-3649 [270]. It was subsequently developed in the Ayadi and Hassan cases (see below, nn 114-115
and accompanying text).
111 Waite and Kennedy v Germany (1999) I Eur Court HR 393 [50].
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Summing up, there does not seem to be a relationship of proportionality between
the means employed and the (legitimate) aims pursued.
One might conclude that an effective and independent procedure to protect
human rights within the framework of the Security Council counter-terrorism
resolutions does not exist or is, at best, seriously ill-equipped to deal with
individual grievances, if the only means available to individuals to challenge
the sanctions is a mere inter-governmental mechanism before the Security Council
itself, not offering any guarantees of independence and transparency.112 The
ECJ should never decline to afford judicial review when no other avenues are
available to the plaintiffs. In the cases under examination, the Court should have
invalidated the EC regulation at least with respect to the plaintiffs, purely because
of the failure of the Community institutions to include in the regulation an
appropriate mechanism for independent judicial review of complaints by affected
individuals and entities.113
C. A ‘Right’ to Diplomatic Protection under European Union
Law and its Enforcement
In two subsequent cases on the implementation of the 1267 sanctions regime,
decided on 12 July 2006, Ayadi 114  and Hassan,115  the CFI substantially upheld
the main line of argument and findings of the Kadi and Yusuf judgments, but
then developed a few aspects further, perhaps in order to address, at least
partially, the perplexity and scepticism with which the earlier judgments had
generally been received by scholars.
Ayadi, a Tunisian national resident in Dublin and designated by the Sanctions
Committee as a person associated with Osama bin Laden, asked the CFI to annul
Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002, with respect to his position.116 The
plea in law relevant for my analysis is the alleged infringement of the fundamental
principle of respect for human rights, in particular Ayadi’s right to access to his
112 See for instance de Wet, above n 73. I also agree with Conforti, above n 12, 343, on the point that
the CFI’s argument according to which the applicants were able to bring an action for annulment before
the Court itself under art 230 EC Treaty (Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [333]-[7]) sounds almost
like a mockery, given that the applicant’s plea referred to the lack of judicial remedies within the UN
sanctions regime.
113  As suggested also by Lavranos, above n 5, 480-3.
114 Ayadi v Council (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 (hereafter Ayadi).
115 Hassan v Council (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 (hereafter Hassan).
116 Art 2 of Regulation No 881/2002 provides:
1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, or owned or held by, a natural or legal person,
group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex 1 shall be frozen;
2. No funds shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a natural or legal
person, group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex 1;
3. No economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, a
natural or legal person, group or entity designated by the Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex
1, so as to enable that person, group or entity to obtain funds, goods or services’.
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property and the right to a judicial remedy under Article 6 ECHR.117  Hassan, a
Libyan national, was detained in the UK while awaiting the outcome of
extradition proceedings brought at the request of the Italian authorities, on
terrorism charges. Hassan maintained that Regulation 881/2002 infringes
fundamental rights and general principles of Community law, most notably the
right to property, the right to respect for private and family life, the right to be
heard and the right to an effective judicial remedy. He lamented he had not been
given any opportunity to put his case forward with respect to his listing in the
contested regulation.118  Most notably, he pointed out that he was not given
any information with respect to the basis for his inclusion in the Sanctions
Committee’s list nor with respect to the state that requested such inclusion.119
In this respect, he claimed that if prior hearing was not appropriate when dealing
with counter-terrorism sanctions, he still ought ‘to have been given the right to
be heard subsequently, so that he might have his name removed from the list
at issue’.120  He furthermore submitted that the de-listing procedure ‘does not
provide for access to an independent or impartial tribunal to challenge on the
merits the refusal of the State concerned to petition the Sanctions Committee for
removal or the Committee’s decision to reject such a petition’.121
The Court relies extensively on Kadi and Yusuf, because during the hearing, the
applicants acknowledged ‘the exhaustive answers to the arguments, in essence
identical, put forward in those cases by the parties in their written pleadings’.122
One of the arguments relied upon by the applicants concerned the Court’s
previous conclusion that the lacuna found to exist in the judicial protection of
the persons targeted by sanctions was still to be seen as compatible with jus
cogens.123 The CFI develops its previous position in at least two directions.124
First, it upholds the point made in Yusuf and Kadi  according to which the
de-listing procedure does not confer upon individuals any right to be heard
before the 1267 Committee, the whole mechanism being based on the traditional
117 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [92]-[102]. Most notably, Ayadi claimed that ‘there is no effective
mechanism for reviewing the individual measures freezing funds adopted by the Security Council, with
the result that the danger is that his property will remain frozen for the rest of his life. On his head the
applicant has argued that he had endeavoured in vain to persuade the Security Council to alter its stance
in relation to him. So, he wrote twice to the Irish authorities, on 5 February 2004 and 19 May 2004,
seeking their assistance in having him removed from the Sanctions Committee list. By letter of 10 October
2005 those authorities informed him that his file was still being considered, but did not give him to
understand that they would take any steps to his advantage’ [102].
118 Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [74]-[6].
119  Ibid [83].
120  Ibid [81].
121  Ibid [83].
122 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [117]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [93].
123 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [118]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [95].
124 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [134]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [104].
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notion of diplomatic protection afforded by a state to its own nationals.125
However, the Court describes the possibility of presenting a request of
re-examination to one’s own government as a ‘right guaranteed not only by [the
Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work] but also by the
Community legal order’.126 This right corresponds to an obligation for each EU
member state to protect fundamental human rights, spelled out by the Court in
such a way that it is clear the Court is not following Yusuf and Kadi:127
[an obligation] in accordance with Article 6 EU, to respect the fundamental
rights of the persons involved, as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law, given that the respect of those fundamental rights
does not appear capable of preventing the proper performance of their obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations.128
In other words, there can be no conflict between human rights and other
obligations under the UN Charter. EU member states must ensure that affected
persons and entities are able to present their cases before the respective domestic
authorities. Also, they must ‘act promptly to ensure that such … cases are
presented without delay and fairly and impartially to the Committee,129  with a
view to their re-examination, if that appears to be justified in light of the relevant
information supplied’.130 While the Court must be commended for this effort
towards a more effective protection of human rights, the obligation that it derives
from EU law, most notably from Article 6 of the Treaty, has no equivalent under
current customary international law, given that there is no general obligation
for states to exercise diplomatic protection.131  Also, some commentators have
125 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [141]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [111]. In this sense,
the Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work, above n 36, offer to states guidance on
how to address the 1267 Committee, in order to start a re-examination procedure.
126 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [145]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [115] [emphasis added].
127  It is probably appropriate to reiterate here that in the previous cases the Court concluded that,
under both customary international law and the EC Treaty, EC member states had an obligation to leave
unapplied any Community law provision that would impede the proper performance of their obligations
under the UN Charter and Security Council resolutions (Yusuf (T-306/01) [2005] ECR II-3533 [240] and
Kadi, (T-315/01) [2005] ECR II-3649 [190]).
128 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [146]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [116] [emphasis added].
129 The Court inferred from the different resolutions adopted by the Security Council an obligation for
states to cooperate fully with the Sanctions Committee and to act in good faith during the re-examination
procedure (Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [142]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [112]).
130 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [147], [149]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [117], [119]. This
means that states must not refuse to initiate a re-examination procedure where requested in accordance
with the Guidelines, even if the affected subjects are not able to provide all relevant information for
the complaint (Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [148] Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [118]).
131  Diplomatic protection is a topic currently under consideration by the International Law Commission.
Some draft articles have been provisionally adopted. See for instance draft articles 1 (‘Definition and
Scope’) and 2 (‘Right to Exercise Diplomatic Protection’) provisionally adopted by the ILC at its
fifty-fourth session in 2002 (Report of the International Law Commission, 55th sess, UN GAOR, 58th sess,
Supp. 10, UN Doc A/58/10 (2003) 81). For a more recent analysis of these issues, see S Touzé, La Protection
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shown a fair degree of scepticism towards inferring such a right from the
Guidelines or the Community legal order.132  It remains to be seen whether the
Court’s innovative position will encourage further developments in the
international practice, in cases involving counter-terrorism sanctions.133
A second aspect of the Ayadi and Hassan cases deserves attention here. The
Court clarifies that the right individuals have to diplomatic protection before
the Sanctions Committee is enforceable before the domestic courts of the state
in question. The role of the domestic judges this time appears to be grounded
on a clearer and firmer basis in Community law, first of all because we now know
that there is an individual ‘right’ to diplomatic protection, but also because the
interaction between the different levels (EC and domestic) of enforcement of the
said right is explained. The Court draws on a jurisprudential Community principle
that is now part of its settled case-law, and according to which ‘in the absence
of Community provisions, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State
to determine the detailed procedural rules governing actions at law intended to
safeguard the rights which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community
law’.134 This principle is applicable in the cases under review, each time a right
to diplomatic protection, derived from EC law, is violated by the competent
national authorities through their refusal to submit a de-listing request to the
1267 Committee. The Court also clarifies that the domestic procedural rules to
be applied in such cases cannot be less favourable than those governing rights
originating in domestic law, nor can they render the exercise of the right to
diplomatic protection virtually impossible or excessively difficult.135  However,
in instances of conflict between the domestic rules and the raison d’être and
objective of the contested EC act, the latter must prevail over the application of
the former.136
des Droits des Nationaux à l’Étranger – Recherches sur la Protection Diplomatique, PhD thesis, University
of Paris II Panthéon-Assas (2006) 307-450.
132  See Lavranos, above n 5, 483; de Wet, above n 73.
133  J Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights: The Draft Articles of the International Law
Commission’ (2005) 24 Australian Year Book of International Law 75, analyses international judicial
practice demonstrating the emergence of a duty of the state to provide diplomatic protection when
certain conditions are met. In particular, he focuses on the recent decision of the South African
Constitutional Court in Kaunda and others v President of the Republic of South Africa (CCT 23/04) [2004]
ZACC 5 (4 August 2004), although the majority argument on the existence of some form of a state’s (a
government’s) obligation to offer diplomatic protection to its nationals abroad was based on the 1996
South African Constitution (82-3).
134 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [151]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [121] [emphasis added].
The principle was spelled out by the ECJ in the Leffler judgment (Götz Leffler v Berlin Chemie AG, Case
C-443/03, Grand Chamber, Decision of 8 November 2005, ECR 2005-1, 9611), and quoted in Dugard,
above n 133.
135 This results from an application of the Community law principles of equivalence and effectiveness
(see Ayadi, (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [152]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [122]).
136  Ibid.
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To sum up, the cases reviewed in this section contribute to giving the protection
of fundamental human rights a higher rank in the hierarchy of international law
obligations. However, the mechanism ‘invented’ by the CFI for the protection
of fundamental human rights of blacklisted individuals and entities does not
actually challenge in any meaningful way the supremacy of UN law over both
Community and domestic law. Indeed, the Court makes it clear that the states’
possible lack of cooperation with concerned individuals, even when it is made
the object of a judicial finding by domestic judges, ‘in no way means that the
[UN’s] procedure for removal from the list is in itself ineffective’.137  One is thus
left with the impression that responses coming from the ‘lower’ levels — the
Community and the domestic levels — apart from inter-governmental action in
the framework of the 1267 Committee, do not have any real impact on what
seems to be a rather human rights-resistant138  UN sanctions regime.
D. New Developments for European Community/European
Union Sanctions Adopted Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1373 (2001)
A partially new approach emerges from a judgment handed down by the Court
on 12 December 2006, with respect to an action brought against an EC decision
in the framework of Community Regulation No 2580/2001 and of Common Position
2001/931/CFSP,139  both implementing Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001).
In 2002, the France-based Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran
(hereafter OMPI), which appeared in the list annexed to the above-mentioned
acts, filed a lawsuit with the CFI for the partial annulment of the above-mentioned
common positions and of a Council decision implementing the above-mentioned
regulations.140 The OMPI claimed that the contested decision, by imposing
sanctions on it without giving the possibility to express its views, infringed its
right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed in particular by Article 6 (2) EU Treaty and
Article 6 ECHR. The OMPI also claimed that it was not even aware of the identity
of the national authority that took the decision to put it on the list for the
purposes of the contested EU/EC acts, nor was it aware of the evidence and
137 Ayadi (T-253/02) [2006] ECR II-2139 [154]; Hassan (T-49/04) [2006] ECR II-52 [124].
138  I am quoting here from the title of Pene Mathew’s presentation at the ANZSIL Annual Meeting 2005
(‘Anti-terrorist = rights-resistant? The Work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee’ Australian and New
Zealand Society of International Law Thirteenth Annual Meeting, The Australian National University,
Canberra, 16-18 June 2005, on file with the author).
139  See above n 31.
140 Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council of the European Union (T-228/02) [2006]
(unreported, available at <http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Rechercher
&alldocs=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&
docjo=docjo&numaff=T-228/02&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100>),
hereafter OMPI.
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information on the basis of which such a decision was taken.141  It thus alleged
that its inclusion in the disputed list was decided ‘apparently solely only on the
basis of documents produced by the Tehran regime’.142  Inclusion in the list
without a previous hearing and without the slightest indication of the factual
and legal grounds providing legal justification also constituted, in the applicant’s
view, an infringement of the obligation to state reasons provided for in Article
253 EC Treaty and of the right to effective judicial protection.143
The Court, while dismissing the action as in part inadmissible and in part
unfounded in so far as it sought annulment of a Council Common Position,144
on the other hand annulled a Council Decision, in so far as it concerned the
applicant, on specific restrictive counter-terrorism measures.145 The decision
of the Court is ground-breaking, because it sets aside some of the obstacles,
which in the previous cases, barred the appellants’ right to judicial review.
It is essential to note that this is the first decision on the merits of a complaint
challenging a sanctions regime different from the one discussed in the previous
cases, and indeed the Court clarifies that its conclusion is determined by the
different features of the 1373 sanctions regime, which the contested EU acts
were implementing.146  Member states are required not only to identify suspected
persons (meaning persons other than those already covered by Resolution 1267),
but also to put in place their own procedure for the freezing of funds. It is
therefore for the member states, and for the Community in some particular cases,
to identify specifically the persons, groups and entities whose funds are to be
frozen, in accordance with the rules in their own legal orders. Then the European
Council, deliberating on the basis of ‘precise information or material which
indicates that a decision has been taken by a competent [national] authority’,147
unanimously decides to set up a list of persons to whom sanctions apply under
the 1373 regime.148 Thus, the CFI holds that, under this sanctions regime, the
141 Art 1 (4) of Common Position 2001/931 spells out the criteria to establish the list of persons, groups
and entities involved in terrorist acts. These criteria were then listed under art 2 (3) of Regulation No
2580/2001.
142 OMPI (T-228/02) [2006] [64], [167].
143  Ibid [65]. I will not consider here the further pleas presented by the applicant and relating,
respectively, to a manifest error of assessment and to the violation of the presumption of innocence
(ibid [66]-[7]).
144  Ibid [60]. The act contested is Council Common Position 2005/936/CFSP of 21 December 2005, updating
Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing
Common Position 2005/847/CFSP [2005] OJ L 340/80. As mentioned at above n 19, the Court cannot
review EU common positions.
145 Council Decision of 21 December 2005 implementing Article 2 (3) of Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on
specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism
and repealing Decision 2005/848/EC [2005] OJ L 340/64.
146 OMPI (T-228/02) [2006] [99]-[108].
147 This is the language of art 2 (3) EC Reg 2580/2001 and art 1 (4) Common Position 2001/931.
148 The initial decision is regulated by art 1 (4) of Common Position 2001/931, which spells out the
criteria to establish the list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts. The subsequent
decisions to freeze funds are regulated under art 1 (6) of the same common position, under which the
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fundamental human rights and safeguards allegedly infringed are fully applicable
to cases such as OMPI, because the relationship between the UN and the
Community level does not limit the action of the latter to the exercise of
circumscribed powers, but rather requires the exercise of its discretionary powers
and appreciation in the establishment and the maintenance of the terrorists’
list.149  Even if this means that the Court will probably decide to uphold the
previous cases when assessing future lawsuits filed against sanctions
implementing the 1267 regime, rather than the 1373 regime, one may still argue
that some elements in the OMPI judgment may lead the Court to reconsider its
position even with respect to the latter regime, at least partially and on a
case-by-case basis.
For instance, the Court does not use the jus cogens argument here and brings the
discussion on the right to a fair hearing back to the terms of the case-law of the
ECJ and of the ECrtHR. The main point is now that even when the disclosure of
confidential material in counter-terrorism sanctions may affect national security,
individuals must still be heard before measures adversely affecting them are
taken.150  In all cases where the right to full disclosure of evidence to the
concerned parties is subject to exceptions,151  the Court concludes that the right
to judicial review is the ultimate guarantee for affected individuals. These points
deserve further explanation.
In the first place, the Court gives the right to a fair hearing at the Community
level a very limited scope.152  According to Common Position 2001/931, the
decision to list individuals and entities at the national level is normally taken
by a competent judicial  authority,153  which should ensure adequate protection
of the right to a fair hearing at the domestic level.154 The Court concludes that
‘observance of the right to a fair hearing has a relatively limited purpose in
respect of the Community procedure for freezing funds’.155  Indeed, as a general
names of persons and entities in the list are to be reviewed at regular intervals, and at least once every
six months to ensure that there are grounds for keeping them in the list. The relevant rules are also laid
down in art 2 (3) of Regulation No 2580/2001, according to which the Council is to establish, review
and amend the list of persons, groups and entities to which that regulation applies, in accordance with
the said Common Position. At the time of writing, the most recent updates are included in Common
Position 2006/380, of 30 May 2006.
149 OMPI (T-228/02) [2006] [102]-[3]. One may note the difference with the ratio decidendi in the Yusuf
and Kadi cases, reproduced above, n 93 and accompanying text.
150 OMPI (T-228/02) [2006] [114]-[37].
151  In the Court’s words, ‘the general principle of observance of the right to a fair hearing requires,
unless precluded by overriding considerations concerning the security of the Community or its member States,
or the conduct of their international relations, that the evidence adduced against the party concerned …
should be notified to it, in so far as possible, either concomitantly with or as soon as possible after the
adoption of the initial decision to freeze funds’ (ibid [137] emphasis added).
152  Ibid [118].
153  See above n 33.
154 OMPI (T-228/02) [2006] [120].
155  Ibid [126].
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rule the European Council must defer as far as possible to the assessment made
by the competent domestic authority, and only when the evidence on which
the national decision is based are not assessed by the said authority, a notification
and a hearing at the Community level will be required.156
On the one hand, the Court highlights how different factors may tend to restrict
the scope of the right to a fair hearing.157 The Court resorts to one of the main
arguments used in the Yusuf and Kadi cases: the need for a ‘surprise effect’ for
counter-terrorism sanctions. Notification to the OMPI of the evidence adduced
by the relevant domestic authority and the granting of a hearing prior to the
decision to freeze funds ‘would thus be incompatible with the public interest
objective pursued by the Community pursuant to Security Council Resolution
1373 (2001)’.158  Drawing on the case law of the ECrtHR, most notably on the
Chahal  and Jasper cases,159  the CFI concludes that:
in circumstances such as those in this case, where what is at issue is a temporary
protective measure restricting the availability of the property of certain persons,
groups and entities in connection with combating terrorism, overriding
considerations concerning the security of the Community and its Member States,
or the conduct of their international relations, may preclude the communication
to the parties concerned of certain evidence adduced against them, and, in
consequence, the hearing of those parties with regard to such evidence, during
the administrative procedure.160
156  Ibid [124]-[5]. Most notably, the Court is aware that, on the basis of the principle of ‘sincere
cooperation’ between member states and the Community institutions, the European Council has an
‘obligation to defer as far as possible to the assessment conducted by the competent national authority,
at least where it is a judicial authority.’ (This is a general principle of Community law, postulating the
reciprocal duty to cooperate in good faith; however, it is also binding in the area of pillar three, JHA
(see Ibid [122]-[4])).
157  Ibid [127].
158  Ibid [128], [136]. Given the need for a surprise effect, the overriding considerations concerning the
security of the Community and of its member states may never be invoked with respect to a subsequent
decision to maintain a person or entity on the disputed list, as distinct from the initial decision to list
such person or entity [131].
159 Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) 23 ECR 1996-V 1831; Jasper v United Kingdom (2000), unreported
[51]-[3]. Mr Chahal was a Sikh separatist leader, who had been detained in custody in the UK for
deportation purposes since August 1990, when his application for asylum was refused and the UK Home
Secretary decided that he was a threat to national security. Mr Chahal filed a lawsuit before the ECrtHR,
alleging that his deportation to India would expose him to a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment. Also, he complained that his detention pending deportation had been too long, and that he
had no legal remedy for his convention claims because of the national security element in his case. The
complaint was brought under arts 3, 5 and 13 of the ECHR. Mr Jasper was a British national who filed
a lawsuit to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the UK of its
obligations under art 6 of the Convention. With respect to some criminal proceedings before the Crown
Court and the Court of Appeal, taken together, the applicant submitted that any failure to disclose
relevant evidence undermined the right to a fair trial, as protected under arts 6 (1) and 3(b) and (d) of
the Convention. Most notably, he contended that ex parte hearings before the judge violated art 6,
because no safeguard against judicial bias or error was afforded, nor was there any opportunity to put
arguments on behalf of the accused.
160 OMPI T-228/02 [2006] [133].
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This being said, under the ECrtHR case law restrictions on the rights of the
defence, justified by public interest in non-disclosure, should nevertheless be
strictly proportionate and counterbalanced by adequate procedural safeguards
followed by the judicial authorities.161 The CFI accordingly finds that there is
a need to notify to the parties concerned the evidence adduced against them in
so far as this is reasonably possible, ‘either concomitantly with or as soon as
possible after the adoption of the initial decision to freeze funds’, to ensure that
they are able to defend their rights effectively.162  Each time a party is not given
the opportunity to be heard before the adoption of one initial decision to freeze
funds, then the obligation to state reasons is the necessary ‘surrogate’ to allow
the affected subjects to challenge the lawfulness of that decision.163
It is against this background that the Court highlights the importance of the
right to effective judicial protection, especially where ‘it constitutes the only
procedural safeguard ensuring that a fair balance is struck between the need to
combat international terrorism and the protection of fundamental rights’.164
Judicial review of the lawfulness of a decision to freeze funds may be provided
by the Court upon an action for annulment (Article 230 EC Treaty) brought by
affected individuals. The CFI finds in the case under review that the contested
decision to include OMPI in the list does not contain a sufficient statement of
reasons and thus it violates the applicant’s right to a fair hearing. Since the Court
161  See the case of Chahal, above n 159 [131], [135], where the ECrtHR found that in cases concerning
national security and terrorism certain restrictions on the right to a fair hearing may be envisaged,
especially concerning disclosure of evidence adduced or terms of access to the file, but then added:
‘This does not mean, however, that the national authorities can be free from effective control by domestic
courts whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved’. In Jasper v
the UK, above n 159 [52]-[3], the same principle implied the need to ensure that the decision-making
procedure, as far as possible, ‘complied with the requirements to provide adversarial proceedings and
equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interests of the accused’. In
particular, Jasper agreed with the UK Government and the European Human Rights Commission that
the right to full disclosure was not absolute and could, in pursuit of a legitimate aim such as the protection
of national security or of vulnerable witnesses or sources of information, be subject to limitations.
However, in the Court’s opinion, any such restriction on the rights of the defence should be strictly
proportionate and counterbalanced by procedural safeguards adequate to compensate for the handicap
imposed on the defence. The views of the ECrtHR were subsequently codified by the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe in the Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism
(2002) Council of Europe
<http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/fight_against_terrorism/2_adopted_texts/
Guidelines%20HR%202005%20E.pdf>. Art IX, under the heading of ‘Legal proceedings’, affirms that
‘a person accused of terrorist activities has the right to a fair hearing, within a reasonable time, by an
independent, impartial tribunal established by law’ (para 1). The restrictions to the right of defence
mentioned under para 3 include the arrangements for access to and contacts with counsel, the
arrangements for access to the case-file and the use of anonymous testimony. Para 4 clarifies that the
said restrictions to the right of defence ‘must be strictly proportionate to their purpose, and compensatory
measures to protect the interests of the accused must be taken so as to maintain the fairness of the
proceedings and to ensure that procedural rights are not drained of their substance’.
162 OMPI T-228/02 [2006] [129].
163  Ibid [141].
164  Ibid [155].
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is not in a position to review the lawfulness of the decision contested by the
OMPI, it annuls the said act in so far as it concerns the applicant.165
The persuasiveness of the Court’s argument rests on the departure from the
jus cogens test and from the heavy reliance on the ‘state of emergency’ paradigm.
The way in which the Court resorts in OMPI to the ‘balance metaphor’ — which
is the test to check that the concerns about the confidentiality of intelligence
information in counter-terrorism are weighed against the procedural justice
standards that must at all times be accorded to individuals — seems more in line
with the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR concerning proportionality of limitations,
as well as with the constitutional traditions common to the member states.166
In conclusion, the OMPI judgment must be welcomed not only for the findings
as to the applicability in abstracto of the right to a fair hearing, but also for its
reasoning as to the safeguards available to enforce this fundamental right.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has reviewed some of the cases brought before the CFI (ECJ) by
individuals and entities seeking judicial review of EU counter-terrorism sanctions,
implementing Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) (and its successor
instruments) and Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). In the first judgments
handed down in these cases, the CFI pays (probably) excessive deference to a
monist vision of the relationship between the United Nations order and the EU
law, postulating an undisputable supremacy of Security Council resolutions
adopted under Chapter VII over the EU legal order. The Court thus declines to
review the lawfulness not only of Security Council’s counter-terrorism sanctions
but also of the implementing acts adopted by the European Council under the
EC Treaty. The CFI position is not in line with the current picture of the EU
system, where as a result of a long work of judicial construction, the protection
of fundamental human rights is well entrenched in the EU Treaty.
It is not clear at this stage whether the ECJ may be ready to uphold the more
encouraging OMPI judgment in future cases arising from the 1267 Sanctions
regime. The OMPI Case may not, then, constitute the charting of a new direction,
nor would it provide an answer to the general question of the designation of
individuals and entities as ‘terrorists’.167 The CFI’s acceptance of a serious lacuna
in the EU human rights framework is all the more worrying if one considers the
165  Ibid [160]-[74].
166 The Court makes it clear that only restrictions to the right to a fair hearing, which are admissible
under domestic law, may be admissible in the case before it. It satisfies itself that restrictions to the
right to be heard in the course of an administrative procedure are permitted in many member states on
grounds of public interest, public policy or the maintenance of international relations, or where the
purpose of the decision to be taken is or could be jeopardised if the said right is observed (ibid [133]-[4]).
167 The information note published by Statewatch on the OMPI judgment (see above n 16) correctly
highlights that ‘the ruling is limited to the decision to freeze the OMPI’s assets, rather than the broader
issuer of its designation as “terrorist”’.
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lack of alternative avenues of redress open to individuals affected by
counter-terrorism measures. Not only must one exclude any significant role for
domestic judges when dealing with judicial review of EC measures (with the
possible exception of preliminary ruling procedures, which would anyway bring
the ball back to the ECJ’s court),168  but also the ECrtHR, in the recent Bosphorus
judgment,169  appears inclined to exercise judicial review only when fundamental
human rights are not otherwise protected in a manner that is equivalent to the
protection afforded by the ECHR. However, this outcome is difficult to reconcile
with the established case law of the ECrtHR, according to which ‘the Convention
is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that
are practical and effective’.170
168  ‘To help safeguard the uniform application of Community law, Article 234 (ex 177) EC therefore
lays down a procedure which enables national courts to refer to the Court of Justice questions of
Community law that they have to decide before giving judgment’ (Arnull, above n 46, 95).
169  Above n 71.
170 Artico v Italy (1980) 37 Eur Court HR (ser A) [33].
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